*390 These references [recent precedent] show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. "History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." . . . This emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided. [FN29] Moreover, Justice Kennedy's search for an "emerging awareness" led him to focus not primarily upon historical culture, practice, or tradition, but instead upon the modern Model Penal Code's recommendation that private sexual conduct not be penalized. [FN30] Additionally, he examined several states' failure to enforce antisodomy laws, for the proposition that homosexual conduct was includable within the Constitution's liberty interest. [FN31] Of far more import, however, was the portion of Justice Kennedy's emerging awareness analysis relying upon foreign sources of law to support the Lawrence holding, such as the British Parliament's 1957 recommendation that homosexual conduct not be punished. [FN32] Most importantly, however, and the focal point of this Article is Justice Kennedy's substantial reliance upon decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, which supported his expansive view of the Constitution's liberty interest:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right . . . . The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) Par. 52. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe . . . the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization. [FN33] *391 Thus, in addition to relying upon domestic developments both prior and subsequent to Bowers, [FN34] Justice Kennedy ushered in a new jurisprudence that utilized foreign sources of law to inform his progressive jurisprudence and, ultimately, domestic constitutional decision-making:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v Sept. 25, 2001 ) . . . . Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. . . . The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. [FN35] Ultimately, therefore, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence underscores his commitment to a progressive approach to constitutional interpretation in values based adjudication as well as a commitment to using foreign sources of law as a method by which to divine the "emerging awareness" [FN36] that characterizes such jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy's use of foreign sources of law as an important aspect of his progressive jurisprudence will be analyzed in Part III.
B. Justice Scalia's "Originalism" in Lawrence In stark contrast to Justice Kennedy's progressivism was Justice Scalia's dissent, which reaffirmed his commitment to an originalist method of constitutional interpretation in values based adjudication. [FN37] Reflecting his commitment to interpreting the Constitution solely in accordance with historical perspectives, Justice Scalia went so far as to declare in Lawrence that "there is no right to 'liberty' under the Due *392 Process Clause, though today's opinion repeatedly makes that claim." [FN38] Indeed, Justice Scalia believes that the Due Process Clause grants procedural rather than substantive protection, leading to his statement in Lawrence that " [t] he Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of 'liberty,' so long as 'due process of law' is provided . . . ." [FN39] Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia's threshold assumption that the Due Process Clause protects procedural, rather than substantive rights, reflects an originalist perspective that could not be more at odds with Justice Kennedy's progressivism. To the extent that Justice Scalia is willing to recognize the existence of substantive rights under the Due Process Clause, he was careful to note in Lawrence that "[w]e have held repeatedly . . . that only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called 'heightened scrutiny' protection-that is, rights which are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' [FN40] Thus, for Justice Scalia, a right qualifies as fundamental under the Due Process Clause only if it is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people" and is "an interest traditionally protected by our society." [FN41] Accordingly, apart from "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," [FN42] "[a]ll other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." [FN43] Applying this framework, Justice Scalia relied upon the traditions, customs and practices of the fifty states to arrive at the "definitive [historical] conclusio[n]" [FN44] that "our Nation has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general-regardless of whether it was performed by same sex or opposite sex couples." [FN45] On this basis alone, Justice Scalia would have found that a contemporary law prohibiting consensual sodomy was well within a state's constitutional prerogative.
*393 More fundamentally, Justice Scalia's originalism entirely rejects the emerging awareness analysis that characterizes Justice Kennedy's progressivism and, in particular, the use of foreign sources of law to divine evolving notions of liberty. As he noted in Lawrence, "an 'emerging awareness' is by definition not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition [s] ,' as we have said 'fundamental right' status requires." [FN46] In Justice Scalia's view, therefore, "[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior." [FN47] Perhaps most importantly, Justice Scalia rejects the use of foreign sources of law because they should have no place whatsoever in the Court's domestic values based constitutional analysis:
Much less do [fundamental rights] spring into existence . . . because foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never relied on "values we share with a wider civilization" . . . but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" . . . Bowers . . . holding is likewise devoid of any reliance on the views of a "wider civilization" . . . . The Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta.
[FN48] Such reliance, moreover, is particularly deleterious because in Justice Scalia's view the Court should not impose fluid foreign culture upon Americans. This statement reflects a core originalist criticism that Justice Scalia espouses regarding "progressivism," that "traditional democratic action . . . should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change." [FN49] 18 UFLJLPP 383
Page 5 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 Ultimately, the differences in approach advocated by Justices Kennedy and Scalia raise the fundamental question of whether progressivism or originalism represents the best method by which to adjudicate values based disputes. The answer to this question first requires a brief analysis of each theory's benefits and limitations, after which this Article introduces the concept of "reverse originalism." *394 III. Constitutional Interpretation in "Values Based" Adjudication: Justice Kennedy's "Progressivism" or Justice Scalia's "Originalism"?
The Lawrence decision underscores the significant divide between Justice Kennedy's and Justice Scalia's constitutional methodology in values based adjudication by raising the critical question of whether progressivism or originalism represents the more efficacious method for deciding the fundamental constitutional questions that such adjudication presents. As a threshold matter, this Article presupposes that the preferable approach is one that leads to results that are consonant with contemporary notions of fairness and equality while remaining faithful to the traditions and practices upon which our constitutional jurisprudence is predicated. Importantly, a brief examination of both approaches, including their benefits and limitations, reveals that a combination of these interpretive methods would most effectively yield a values based jurisprudence that responds to contemporary perspectives while respecting our Nation's historical underpinnings. Such a combination, termed "reverse" or "negative" originalism, is introduced in Part IV.
A. Justice Kennedy's Progressivism-Reliance on Foreign Sources of Law to Divine an Emerging Awareness
Perhaps the most critical component of Justice Kennedy's progressive analysis in Lawrence was his reliance upon foreign sources of law, particularly decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, to inform his determination that there existed an emerging awareness in favor of protecting private consensual homosexual conduct. Indeed, the very concept of emerging awareness implies that a court will look beyond a country's geographic borders to determine, as Justice Kennedy noted, whether the "values we share with a wider civilization" [FN50] evince a predilection or tendency to protect a newly asserted, constitutionally-cognizable right.
The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether reliance upon foreign sources of law is a viable method by which to adjudicate domestic values based constitutional controversies. An examination of this question reveals that Justice Kennedy's reliance upon foreign sources of law raises several concerns. [FN51] cited by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, the ECHR held that consensual homosexual conduct was a protected "privacy" right pursuant to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [FN52] Significantly, Justice Kennedy's reliance upon the ECHR (and other sources of foreign law) was an important aspect of his progressivism, namely, his belief that an emerging awareness of the "values we share with a wider civilization" existed in favor of prohibiting the criminalization of consensual homosexual conduct.
[FN53] However, such reliance raises legitimate concerns that courts must address when using foreign sources of law to support domestic constitutional issues.
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As an institutional matter, the ECHR is responsible for interpreting and applying the European Convention on Human Rights, which is viewed as an international treaty and not a domestic, organic text. [FN54] This distinction is significant because the ECHR's institutional role necessarily implicates different considerations both as a matter of philosophy and of interpretation as an arbitor of human rights, as opposed to domestic constitutional disputes. Also, the ECHR is an international, rather than domestic, court and its overriding purpose is to effectuate, and arguably expand, the broad human rights guarantees of an international treaty. The ECHR's institutional role, therefore, is both more specific and far broader than that of a domestic constitutional court because its primary role is to interpret and provide substantive meaning to a document (the Convention) *396 whose provisions are unified by an overriding human rights objective. Indeed, the specific objective of the ECHR's mission necessarily entails the use of interpretive methods that differ vastly from a domestic constitutional court, which often construes constitutional provisions that are separate from, unrelated to, and not connected by an exclusive substantive purpose. As a result, unlike a domestic constitutional court, the ECHR's specifically defined institutional role creates a paramount value upon which its jurisprudence develops.
Furthermore, the narrower nature of the ECHR's institutional purpose is enhanced by the fact that, as an international court interpreting an international treaty, it is not bound by the traditional temporal and geographic limitations to which domestic constitutional courts are often bound. For example, as expressed by Justice Scalia in Lawrence, a domestic constitutional court may limit itself to analyzing the history, customs, traditions, and practices of its country while eschewing the consideration of sources from beyond its borders when interpreting a national constitution.
[FN55] The significance of this concept is that a domestic constitutional court's jurisprudence is often constrained, resulting in jurisprudence uniquely personal to its territorial jurisdiction. In this way, the perspectives of a domestic constitutional court are likely to differ substantially from those of an international human rights court because the sources of decision-making are different. Stated simply, the legal dynamics between the ECHR and domestic constitutional courts are quite distinct because the ECHR has at its disposal a significantly broader array of law, tradition, and custom upon which to inform its human rights based jurisprudence. This fact is perhaps best underscored in the differing interpretive methodology that the ECHR employs in values based adjudication.
B. The ECHR's Status as an International Human Rights Court, Which Interprets an International Human Rights Treaty, Engenders an Interpretive Methodology Distinct from Those Employed by Many Domestic Constitutional Courts
The concerns raised by incorporation of ECHR precedent in American constitutional law are underscored by the fact that both courts employ different interpretive methodologies. First, the ECHR interprets the provisions of international treaties in accordance with international law principles. [FN56] Indeed, in Golder v. United Kingdom, [FN57] the ECHR stated that *397 interpretation of the Convention's provisions would be guided by the interpretive methods established at the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. [FN58] The international character of the ECHR's jurisprudence, therefore, only re-enforces the differing approaches to constitutional interpretation that the ECHR and U.S. Supreme Court apply. [FN59] Of more consequence, however, is the dynamic or evolving method of interpretation that the ECHR has increasingly employed in its jurisprudence. Arising from Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, which states that the terms of a treaty should be interpreted in light of its object and purpose, [FN60] the ECHR has adopted a dy-
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Page 7 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 namic approach that views the Convention as "a living instrument which . . . must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions." [FN61] Indeed, the ECHR's dynamic approach manifests itself through the "effectiveness principle," in which the ECHR stresses that the Convention "is intended to guarantee 'not rights that are theoretical or illusory but practical and effective"' [FN62] :
Regarding the former, the Court will interpret the Convention's provisions in order to make them 'practical and effective' in servicing the broad objective it has adopted. Thus, if the treaty by its plain language is not 'effectively' protecting a particular right, the Court will see fit to make it so through expansive interpretation. [FN63] In essence, "the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective *398 . . . any interpretation must be consistent with . . . the ideals and values of a democratic society." [FN64] The Court's "living document" philosophy is also reflected in the "consensus doctrine," a method by which the Court "finds an internal European consensus, assumes this increase in rights was done in fealty to the Convention, and then imposes this new standard on the straggling state." [FN65] For example, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom," [FN66] the ECHR "looked outside of Europe and found an international 'common ground' granting full legal recognition of gender reassigned transsexuals . . . ." [FN67] In accordance with its evolving method of interpretation, the ECHR stated that "while there had not been a statistical increase in States giving full legal recognition of gender re-assignment within Europe, information from outside Europe showed developments in [that] direction." [FN68] Thus, Goodwin not only underscores the Court's expansive view of the Convention's provisions, but "by reaching beyond Europe [it] explicitly connects the Court's interpretation with evolving international human rights standards." [FN69] Lastly, in certain areas, the ECHR's expansive jurisprudence has resulted in the imposition of "positive obligations" upon Member States, which is a requirement that a particular Member State undertake measures to ensure the effectuation of a particular right.
[FN70]
Importantly, the ECHR's dynamic, "living document" philosophy has resulted in very expansive decisions that most American courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, would be unlikely to countenance. This proposition is evident in the ECHR's "privacy" jurisprudence, particularly in the area of relational privacy, which arises under Article 8 of the convention. [FN71] For example, in A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, [FN72] the Court *399 held that the United Kingdom's "Sexual Offenses Act of 1967" violated Article 8 because, although it decriminalized homosexual conduct, it expressly prohibited such conduct where more than two individuals were present. [FN73] Likewise, in Goodwin, the Court accorded full legal recognition to transsexuals, [FN74] and thereafter, in Van Kuck v. Germany, [FN75] expanded the rights of transsexuals, finding that the German courts violated Article 8 by failing to define gender reassignment surgery as a necessary medical treatment [FN76] and thus eligible for reimbursement by a private insurance company. [FN77] Likewise, in the area of "zonal" or "territorial" privacy, the Court, in Von Hannover v. Germany, [FN78] held that Princess Carolina's right to privacy under Article 8 was violated when she was photographed by media officials while engaging in leisurely activities outside of her residence. [FN79] Additionally, in Peck v. United Kingdom, [FN80] the Court held that a British citizen, who was located by police attempting to commit suicide in a public place, suffered a violation of his privacy where a videotape of the event was televised by national and local media outlets. [FN81] The Court's dicta in its Article 8 jurisprudence further underscores the expanding nature of privacy rights in Europe. For example, in Goodwin, the Court stated that "serious interference with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal identity . [FN82] Likewise, in Van Kuck, the Court indicated *400 that the concept of private life is very broad and encompasses "an individual's physical and social identity, . . . personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world." [FN83] Additionally, in Von Hannover, the Court stated that its notions of private life "ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings [in the public domain]." [FN84] The right to privacy, moreover, "includes a social dimension," [FN85] that extends "into the 'public context"' [FN86] and "may include activities of a professional or business nature." [FN87] The ECHR's privacy jurisprudence highlights both its differing institutional role and jurisprudential focus from that of the U.S. Supreme Court. First, its decisional law under Article 8 demonstrates that the ECHR is committed to expanding the concept of privacy to the outer limits of what can be deemed an "emerging awareness" of values that are shared by a "wider civilization." [FN88] Its view of Article 8 is primarily forward-looking and progressive. Its precedent places few, if any, strict limitations upon an individual's right to private life. [FN89] Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court's approach informed by its responsibility to interpret a constitutional text, reflects the fact that the U.S. Constitution both grants and restricts the fundamental guarantees that it embodies. [FN90] Because these courts are interpreting very different documents, which not only have different purposes and objectives, but also derive from a different historical dynamic, these courts serve different institutional roles. This notion is at least partially responsible for the differing degrees of protection that privacy engenders in the European Union as opposed to the United States. Consequently, to the extent that judges such as Justice Kennedy rely upon foreign law to support a domestic constitutional decision, they must *401 consider not only the judgments themselves but also the institutions and doctrinal bases from which they emanate.
C. The ECHR is not as Committed to the Democratic Premise of Majoritarianism
Another substantial difference is that the ECHR, particularly in the area of "morals" legislation, is not nearly as deferential to European Member States as is the U.S. Supreme Court to individual states. This is reflected in the ECHR's tendency to de-emphasize the "margin of appreciation" [FN91] doctrine and, in some cases, impose positive obligations upon Member States to ensure realization of a particular right. The margin of appreciation is designed, in theory, to accord some measure of deference to Member States' legislative enactments. [FN92] As a practical matter, however, particularly in morals or public welfare legislation, the ECHR has been reticent to apply this doctrine consistently. For example, in Norris v. Ireland, [FN93] the ECHR stated that "not only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of the activities involved will affect the scope of the margin of appreciation." [FN94] Thus, in cases implicating "a most intimate aspect of private life . . . there must exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities can be legitimate." [FN95] In fact, in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, [FN96] the ECHR held that serious reasons exist only where the legislation at issue "answers a pressing social need" [FN97] and is "proportionate" [FN98] to the asserted objective. However, as Bonat states, " [t] here is no hard and fast rule on the scope of the margin of appreciation . . . . It is a self-regulating doctrine for the Court, and as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is accorded to the parties." [FN99] Thus, the uneven (and uncertain) degree to which its Court will apply the "margin of appreciation," coupled with the application of "positive obligations" in some cases (discussed below), substantially eviscerate any meaningful deference to Member States where fundamental rights are implicated. [FN100] *402 Pursuant to the related (although distinct), doctrine of "positive obligations," the ECHR has held that To be fair, however, pursuant to the doctrine of "subsidiarity," the Member States "are primarily responsible for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the Convention, so it falls to the State in question how it is to comply with the Court's decision." [FN102] The ECHR's activist approach differs substantially from the deference that American courts generally afford to state legislative enactments, particularly in the context of morals. Again, this is due both to the American constitutional structure and the legal framework adopted by particular courts. For example, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of enumerated powers that vests in individual states the primary legislative authority in areas such as health, welfare, and public safety. [FN103] Of course, while the debate continues regarding the degree of deference courts should accord to legislatures [FN104] in a significant majority of cases involving values or morality, courts ordinarily do not substitute their subjective policy predilections for those of a particular state legislature. [FN105] Conversely, while recognizing this principle in theory, the ECHR's application of the margin of appreciation, coupled with its imposition of positive obligations upon Member States, suggest that it is, at least in certain areas, far more willing to invalidate legislation that arguably furthers legitimate objectives, and upon which reasonable minds could conceivably disagree. [FN106] To be sure, the ECHR's activist role represents a logical outgrowth of its dynamic *403 interpretive method, which consistently strives to broaden the Convention's human rights guarantees despite the absence of a European consensus. [FN107] However, the ECHR's evolving judicial philosophy is incompatible with the American principle that courts should not invalidate legislation that serves as a core product of the democratic process, federalism, and majority rule. [FN108] As one commentator has noted, "European constitutional tradition contemplates 'a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their authority from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain national self-government."' [FN109] Ultimately, American courts and the ECHR afford states different degrees of deference when reviewing values based legislation. For this reason, instances will undoubtably arise where the ECHR would likely reach different results in cases involving similar facts. [FN110] This important distinction counsels against relying too heavily upon foreign sources of law, at least without due regard to the unique institutional nuances that facilitate particular decision-making processes.
*404 D. Foreign Sources of Law Are the Product of Unique Cultural, Social, Economic, and Political Dynamics
Finally, foreign court decisions do not exist in isolation but are instead responsive to the unique historical, cultural, social, and constitutional traditions that influence a court's perspective. As law professor Kenneth Anderson explains, unlike the United States, Western European constitutionalism does not place emphasis upon the primacy of democratic self-governance and national majoritarian prerogatives:
[F]ollowing the nationalist disasters of the interwar and Second World War period, much of Western Europe's constitutionalism was explicitly about reaching to any available source of constitutionalism other than national democratic self-government, which, equated with populism, was seen in no small part as a root evil of war and social strife. It is a tradition deeply fearful of democracy and above all hostile to the 18 UFLJLPP 383
Page 10 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 concept of popular sovereignty. Indeed, in international constitutionalism, "interpretation by a body of international jurists is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local interpretation, which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological political disputes." [FN111] Importantly, this approach differs dramatically from the American perspective, which "regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation's democratically self-given legal and political commitments . . . . The difficulty, therefore, in relying upon foreign sources of law, as Justice Kennedy did in Lawrence, is that one may not be sufficiently mindful of the vastly different historical, cultural, and constitutional perspectives that inform a particular decision. This problem is evident in a comparison of Western European and American constitutionalism, particularly the ECHR's jurisprudence, which starkly contrasts with its dynamic framework from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the United States, unlike in Western Europe, "[c]onstitutional interpretation is not merely a matter of 'best policy,' considered in a vacuum, but 'best policy' *405 as it has arisen through democratic processes-which may or may not have been successful in reaching the best policy." [FN114] In other words, American constitutionalism represents "a vision of democratic constitutional self-government founded on democracy and popular sovereignty-everything that international constitutionalism and the European tradition most rejects." [FN115] Thus, the problems of "comparative constitutionalism" suggest that American courts should be hesitant to place substantial reliance upon foreign court decisions in the domestic constitutional context. The presence of widely divergent historical, political, and constitutional traditions requires, at the very least, that judges comprehend the context within which a foreign decision was rendered, a task that may itself be impractical. Moreover, the sheer volume of foreign materials upon which a court may elect to rely can create the appearance of selfserving expedience or, far worse, render such reliance susceptible to claims of arbitrariness. In addition, venturing outside of the domestic constitutional context risks engendering the claim that a particular judge (or court) is acting in an elitist manner that is intended to further a subjective policy predilection not supported by domestic law and tradition. Such a claim would be particularly troubling in the American constitutional structure because its tradition explicitly emphasizes national democratic self-government and respect for majority will. [FN116] Of course, this does not mean that foreign sources cannot operate to support domestic decisions in some instances. [FN117] This Article does not claim that foreign sources of law should never be used, but rather that its use in values based adjudication should be done cautiously and with particular sensitivity to the historical traditions of all nations involved. Critically, this claim substantially undermines Justice Kennedy's progressivism, because a substantial component of that approach is to rely upon foreign sources of law to discern a rights based consensus.
These concerns ultimately do not necessarily mandate that Justice Kennedy's progressivism be eliminated as a viable method to adjudicate values based disputes because any constitutional approach will invariably present problems of practical application. In fact, Justice Scalia's *406 originalism implicates separate, and perhaps more troubling, concerns that render his approach to values based adjudication particularly dubious.
E. Justice Scalia's Originalism-Problems With Exclusive Reliance Upon the American Constitutional Tradition
In Lawrence, Justice Scalia eschewed the majority's reliance upon foreign jurisprudence, dismissing it as 18 UFLJLPP 383
Page 11 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 "meaningless dicta" that sought to "impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." [FN118] For Justice Scalia, the only values, or rights, that are worthy of constitutional protection are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." [FN119] To be sure, the asserted right must "be an interest traditionally protected by our society" [FN120] and "so rooted in the . . . conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." [FN121] Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted in Lawrence that, even if a right is designated as fundamental, it is not immune from restriction should an individual state proffer a compelling interest justifying its infringement.
[FN122] Moreover, all other asserted liberty interests "may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." [FN123] Applying his originalist philosophy in Lawrence, Justice Scalia surveyed the historical landscape, particularly state legislative enactments and, rather than discerning an interest "traditionally protected by our society," [FN124] he found that "our Nation has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general . . . ." [FN125] Accordingly, Justice Scalia would have upheld the State of Texas's prohibition upon consensual sodomy, even though it was directed at same-sex couples, because the historical tradition of prohibiting such conduct existed "regardless of whether it was performed by same-sex or opposite-sex couples." [FN126] It is therefore not surprising that, for Justice Scalia, the use of foreign law in this context was not only "meaningless dicta," [FN127] but contrary to the requirement that fundamental rights be rooted in domestic tradition and practice. Thus, *407 Justice Scalia's "originalist" philosophy in "values" based constitutional adjudication places no confidence whatsoever in relying upon foreign sources of law. [FN128] However, the application of Justice Scalia's "originalism" in this context is not without its conceptual and practical difficulties. First, despite the ease with which Justice Scalia apparently discerns domestic constitutional tradition relating to a particular issue, such an endeavor can prove elusive and, in some cases, lead to inconsistent views on precisely what this Nation's historical practice communicates. The domestic historical record, whether it is law, custom, or practice, is not likely to provide a straightforward answer to questions regarding the specific rights that should be deemed fundamental. In fact, the record may be susceptible to varying degrees of interpretation that depend more upon how the inquiry is framed, rather than upon the existence of a traditional consensus. Accordingly, reliance upon history and tradition is capable of the same arbitrary and self-serving reliance that the use of foreign law potentially risks.
In Lawrence, for example, Justice Kennedy disputed Justice Scalia's view that there existed a "long standing history in this country of laws" proscribing homosexual conduct. [FN129] Justice Scalia responded by asserting that traditional practice prohibited sodomy in general, underscoring that the method by which a court frames the relevant inquiry can have a direct impact upon that court's interpretation of historical practice. [FN130] In any event, the sheer volume of the historical traditions or practices of which Justice Scalia speaks are not likely to provide straightforward guidance in specific cases. [FN131] Second, and more fundamentally, application of the originalist paradigm can result in unjust decisions that, based upon contemporary perspectives, are inconsistent with modern notions of liberty, equality, and fairness. The significant divide between Justice Kennedy's progressivism and Justice Scalia's originalism suggests that reliance upon evolving notions *409 of fairness and liberty, based upon domestic and foreign perspectives, cannot be reconciled with a court's duty to remain firmly committed to domestic history and tradition. In fact, Justice Kennedy's reliance upon the ECHR directly conflicts with Justice Scalia's belief that the only rights worthy of protection are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's" historical tradition.
[FN134]
The more fundamental question, however, concerns the purposes underlying Justice Kennedy's reliance upon foreign sources of law and his position that "[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." [FN135] It would not be unduly speculative to assume that the Lawrence opinion reflected a Supreme Court trying to achieve the "best policy," or the result that is most consistent with evolving perspectives of equality, liberty and fairness. Apart from the likelihood that such an approach will invite claims of "elitism," judicial policymaking and arbitrariness, the Lawrence majority was, at its core, trying to achieve a just and equitable result for a group that has traditionally been underrepresented and unprotected in our society. Whether the Court achieved that result is a matter for debate. What is fairly uncontroversial is that progressivism, in its most basic application, seeks to achieve the "right" outcome in a particular case, and the use of foreign material is an important component of that search. [FN136] This approach could not be in greater conflict with Justice Scalia's "originalist" philosophy. Indeed, constitutional rights do not "spring into existence" simply because an evolving consensus supports their recognition.
[FN137] On the contrary, policy change falls squarely within the purview of democratic processes as reflected through majority rule and subsequent legislative promulgation. [FN138] Scalia dissents, therefore, the Lawrence majority represented a circumvention of our constitutional structure "through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change." [FN139] In Justice Scalia's view, American constitutionalism does not rely upon the "values we share with *410 a 'wider civilization,"' [FN140] but instead finds expression through the values and policy predilections that historical domestic tradition reveals.
To begin with, both Justice Kennedy's progressivism and Justice Scalia's originalism have critically important components that are highly relevant to, and are a valuable aspect of, American constitutionalism. As a normative matter, judges should strive to achieve the "right" result-results that are consonant with principles of fair-
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Page 13 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 ness and equality, particularly where evolving notions have demonstrated an existing practice to be oppressive or unjust. The idea-that courts will endeavor to prohibit state action that is inimical to basic due process guarantees-is neither novel nor suspect in our domestic practice. In fact, the Supreme Court's history is replete with precedent where the Court has invalidated long-standing practices that time has shown to be inconsistent with equal treatment. [FN141] Although, the line between proper judicial function and undesirable judicial activism is often unclear, it cannot be said that a court's scrupulous efforts to achieve the "right" outcome is per se objectionable. Stated simply, progressivism and its desire to achieve equitable outcomes should have a role in American constitutionalism.
On the other hand, a court that strives to achieve just outcomes through substitution of its policy predilections cannot be said to be acting within permissible boundaries. Thus, to the extent that a court affects the "right" outcome at the expense of deference to a legislature's constitutional authority, its decision should be exposed as intolerable judicial activism. The venerable respect for the legislature's policymaking prerogative, both as an institution and expression of democratic processes, is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and traditions." [FN142] Additionally, courts refer to and rely upon our historical tradition when determining whether an asserted right warrants constitutional protection. [FN143] Indeed, domestic tradition can provide important insights regarding the intent, scope, and purposes which underlie our most fundamental rights.
Moreover, knowledge of that history can inform a court's perspectives regarding the degree to which a newly-asserted right has a cognizable basis in the constitutional text. Reliance upon domestic tradition ensures that our social, political, and cultural practices, as expressed through *411 democratic processes and majority will, occupy a venerable place in constitutional decision-making. Thus, when confronted with values based adjudication, courts should be cognizant not only of their institutional limitations, but also of the long-standing history that informs our very notion of what it means to declare a newly-asserted "fundamental" right. Put differently, the originalist position is an important aspect of American constitutional law.
The critical problem, for which this Article proposes a modest solution, is the failure to realize that both the progressive and originalist philosophies can be integrated into a unified method of constitutional interpretation. This Article posits that "negative" or "reverse" originalism represents a plausible method by which to remain faithful to historical tradition while simultaneously achieving outcomes that are consistent with evolving notions of liberty. The concept of negative originalism is based upon the assumption that domestic tradition should be a core aspect of constitutional adjudication because such tradition reflects the unique cultural, political, and social character of national constitutionalism. However, negative originalism presupposes that the concept of "rights," particularly those worthy of constitutional protection, should not remain stagnant or fixed in history. Rather, rights-recognition should be responsive to the evolving perspectives of liberty that human experience generates.
Based upon these assumptions, the theory of negative originalism would require a court not to divine the precise meaning of broadly worded constitutional phrases or of long-standing historical practice. Such an endeavor would likely entail distinct interpretive difficulties, be subject to contrary conclusions, and risk arbitrary and self-serving utilization. In some cases, moreover, the historical record will be invariably unclear and susceptible to varying interpretations, thus proving inadequate for constitutional decision-making processes. Furthermore, to the extent that domestic practice can answer modern questions of rights-protection, the result may be highly unjust or inequitable.
Negative originalism would require a court to ascertain whether protection of a newly-asserted right would be contrary to, inconsistent with, or discountenanced by the salutary values that our domestic tradition embraces.
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Negative originalism would therefore require a court to discern the general or overriding principles that underlie a particular constitutional provision such as the Due Process Clause, or a particular historical practice such as race-related legislation, and examine whether the newly-asserted right would contravene the general intent that has manifested itself through evolution of domestic law. In this way, negative originalism would still require a court, particularly in values based cases, to conduct *412 a searching examination of the historical record, as expressed through constitutional and legislative history, to ensure that newly-recognized rights are supported by domestic tradition and not the result of judicial policy predilection. In other words, the broad values that our country has deemed sacrosanct, through democratic process and majoritarian rule, warrant special recognition as expressions of our most deeply-held notions of liberty. Moreover, an integral aspect of that recognition must be rooted in judicial decision-making that strives to continue the evolution in rights-recognition that this country has unquestionably undergone, yet in a manner that is consistent with the broad values underlying that evolution rather than subjective policy preferences.
Critically, the requirement that courts ascertain only the broad values or general intent upon which domestic tradition is based reflects the principle that concepts of liberty, fairness, and equality evolve over the course of time and through the trials of human experience. Indeed, whether it is the experience of the United States or foreign nations, concepts of rights protection are undoubtedly informed by human events, cultural evolution, and social awareness. For example, evolving notions of discriminatory treatment have resulted in increasing protection for traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women, minorities, and homosexuals, through legislative action and policy reform. [FN144] Furthermore, evolutions in the very principles that have formed our national constitutionalism have resulted in a society that is more fair, equal, and free. Indeed, the judiciary has played a vital role in eradicating, through landmark decisions, various oppressive practices that evolving concepts would likely not tolerate. [FN145] Stated simply, negative originalism recognizes that values based adjudication must allow for the benefits that modern notions of liberty and fairness will provide.
In addition, negative originalism reflects the fact that, in modern jurisprudence, difficult issues invariably arise that could neither have been contemplated by the drafters of our Constitution and early legislation nor resolved by reference to historical tradition. The broad text of the Constitution's provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause, arguably serve as a testament to this notion. However, while various contemporary values disputes could not have been anticipated or foreseen, the Constitution does set forth broad provisions concerning liberty that can *413 inform resolution of these disputes. [FN146] It is precisely for this reason that the broad guarantees upon which, for example, the Due Process Clause is based are relevant to answering the questions posed in values based adjudication. As such, negative originalism contemplates an active role for courts in discerning whether recognition of a newly-asserted right would contravene the salutary principles that influenced the evolution of domestic tradition and practice. Importantly, while negative originalism requires courts to only discern the general intent underlying a given constitutional provision or historical tradition, such inquiry should be neither confining nor superficial. For example, courts should focus upon the relevant circumstances, context, and expectations which lead to the historical evolution of liberty interests to determine whether expansion of this interest warrants recognition of a newly-asserted right.
Of course, this proposition begs the question whether, and to what extent, foreign sources of law should factor into a court's analysis. As a preliminary matter, negative originalism would allow the use of foreign sources of law, but only to the extent that such sources are neither inconsistent with nor contrary to the domestic evolution of a particular constitutional value. In other words, foreign sources of law should not be used to justify a court's subjective policy judgment or unilateral desire to "draw American constitutional norms into 'ever closer union' . . . with those of the rest of the world." [FN147] 18 UFLJLPP 383
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Foreign sources of law should not be used to globalize the Supreme Court at the expense of our unique domestic tradition; they should be used to confirm that an expansion of our domestic practice to recognize a newly asserted right is supported by a national evolution that justifies incorporation with international consensus. Otherwise, the use of foreign materials will be susceptible to claims of arbitrariness, elitism, and the desire by courts to substitute their policy predilections for those expressed through the democratic process. [FN148] The use of foreign materials in such a manner would be troubling because it would undermine the values of our national constitutionalism and slowly remove constitutional decision-making from the historical tradition upon which it rests.
These sentiments only serve as a brief introduction to negative originalism because its application will certainly engender practical *414 difficulties. For instance, it can be argued that ascertaining merely the general intent underlying historical concepts of liberty will allow courts to utilize undefined platitudes that are nowhere justified in domestic tradition to unilaterally recognize new constitutional rights. The concept of "liberty," for example, can mean whatever a court holds and can result in precisely the type of judicial policymaking that lies within the province of legislative action. In addition, with a modest amount of creative interpretation, courts will be able to selectively cite to domestic and foreign sources and justify whatever "rights expansion" they deem desirable. Similarly, while it may be possible to discern the general intent underlying specific constitutional provisions, such intent can never justify progressive jurisprudence that the Constitution's drafters failed to contemplate.
These concerns are valid and merit significant debate. The problem, however, is that the same arguments can be advanced against Justice Scalia's originalism, Justice Kennedy's progressivism, or any interpretive paradigm that vests judges with substantial discretion. Negative originalism attempts to channel that discretion in such a manner that gives domestic practice primacy in constitutional decision-making, yet allows courts to recognize that history has limits concerning the situations to which it can be applied.
The presence of a modern consensus that results from collective human experience does not mean that a progressive jurisprudence undermines domestic tradition. Moreover, by requiring courts to ensure that expansive rights-protection, based upon contemporary perspectives, does not undermine or offend our domestic tradition, negative originalism strives to ensure that courts exercise extreme care in recognizing newly asserted rights. Courts must be sensitive to the historical record and responsive to evolving notions of justice to provide meaningful contemporary understandings of the Constitution's most basic guarantees.
Ultimately, courts should be circumspect to recognize "new" rights and even more careful to place undue reliance upon foreign sources of law. If there exists uncertainty or conflict in domestic practice, then progressive change is best left to the democratic process. However, the "emerging awareness" [FN149] reflected in values based adjudication warrants application of the principle that "[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." [FN150] [FNa1]. Master of Laws, NYU School of Law; J.D., With Honors, Ohio State University College of Law (2001); B.A.,University of Southern California (1997). Lamparello is currently a Westerfield Fellow at Loyola University in New Orleans, and teaching legal research and writing as well as moot court. CV available upon request.
[FN1]. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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